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exercise reasonable care to avoid endangering those using the highway
as a means of travel, and is liable for any injuries resulting from such
negligence. This duty was limited to cases where a landowner
negligently released upon the highway an "agency that becomes
dangerous by its very nature once upon the highway." The Raburns
alleged KJI and the Straders diverted water into the culvert by putting
crushed concrete on the property, and thus owed a duty to those
traveling on that highway.
The court found this allegation to be conclusory, and not
supported by more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raised a
genuine issue of material fact. Even if the Raburns could put forth
sufficient evidence, the court held their claim would fail on alternate
grounds. The Texas Water Code states that one who diverts the
natural flow of surface waters may be liable for any property damage
suffered as a result of the diversion. The code does not include
liability for survival actions, personal injuries, or wrongful death.
Additionally, the state of Texas' responsibility over water covering a
stretch of highway pertained only to flood water. The court found the
trial court accurately held the water discussed here was floodwater,
rather than surface water, as a matter of law. This finding was largely
due to the admissions of the Raburns themselves, as well as on the
clear and unambiguous definitions of surface and floodwaters found
in Texas case law.
Since the state of Texas had an exclusive, non-delegable duty
pertaining to flood control, the trial court was correct in holding KJI
and the Straders did not have a duty of reasonable care pertaining to
the highway adjacent to their land. The Raburns failed to produce
more than a scintilla of evidence pursuant to one of the elements of a
negligence claim, and, thus, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to KJI and the Straders.
Michael Sheehan

VERMONT
Town of Groton v. Agency of Natural Res., 772 A.2d 1103 (Vt. 2001)
(affirming the Water Resource Board's denial of the Town of Groton's
stream alteration permit application).
In July of 1996, the Town of Groton ("Town") filed an application
with the Agency of Natural Resources ("ANR") to alter the Wells River
so that the Town could repair a dam. The ANR requested more
information, as the Town's application was not complete. Before the
Town provided the requested information, ice and high water
destroyed the dam. Since the dam's destruction, the Wells River below
the dam is considered one of the few high quality habitats for sculpin,
trout, and salmon.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

As a result of the river returning to its natural state and thereby
improving fish habitat, the ANR denied the Town's application to alter
the Wells River under Vermont statute 10 V.S.A. § 1023. This statute
mandates the denial of any application proposing a change in a
watercourse which would "significantly damage fish life." The Town
appealed this denial to the Water Resource Board ("Board"), who after
a de novo review, also determined that the proposed alteration would
"significantly damage fish life" and thus denied the application. The
Town appealed the Board's decision to the Caledonia Superior Court,
claiming that the Board erred in upholding the denial by refusing to
admit evidence regarding the use of the water for fire safety, and by
utilizing an improper river baseline which resulted in a determination
of significant fish damage. The court affirmed the Board's decision.
The town appealed to the Supreme Court of Vermont, renewing the
aforementioned arguments.
The supreme court reviewed this appeal of the Board's decision
under criteria set forth in their decisions of In re Town of Sherburneand
In re Wal Mart Stores, Inc. Specifically, the supreme court asked if the
board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or contrary to the law as viewed
by a "reasonable person." It also questioned whether the board used
its wide discretion within legislative and agency policy in making its
findings and conclusions.
The supreme court denied the Town's first claim that the Board
erred by failing to consider fire safety as an element relating to the
general public interest and welfare. The supreme court disagreed,
stating that the Board was bound by statute and could not consider fire
safety evidence because it is outside the general public interest and
welfare factors identified in 10 V.S.A. § 1023. Next, the supreme court
denied the Town's second claim, which urged the supreme court to
review the Board's historical practice. The Town claimed the Board
erred in utilizing the condition of the river after the destruction of the
dam because the Board historically utilized the condition of the river
with the dam in place. However, the Board decided previous cases this
way because no evidence existed showing the condition of the river
prior to the dam. In this case, the supreme court determined the issue
was reversed. The Town did not have any reliable information as to
the river condition and the fish habitat while the dam was in place,
while the ANR had reliable information as to the river condition and
the fish habitat after the destruction of the dam. Therefore, the court
determined the Board followed its historical practices in refusing to
engage in speculation, and looked to the stream in its natural
condition as the baseline.
The supreme court concluded the Board acted consistently with its
previous decisions and that this decision was not arbitrary,
unreasonable or contrary to law.
William H. Fronczak

